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We provide new evidence on the impact of peer effects on the schooling decisions of 
teenagers. In November 1980 a major earthquake hit Southern Italy. In the aftermath, young 
men from certain towns were exempted from compulsory military service. We show that the 
exemption raised high school graduation rates of boys by more than 2 percentage points by 
comparing high school graduation rates of young exempt men and older not exempt men 
from the least damaged areas and men of the same age groups from nearby towns that were 
not hit by the quake. Similar comparisons show that graduation rates of young women in the 
affected areas rose by about 2 percentage points. Since in Italy women are not subject to 
drafting, we interpret these findings as evidence of social effects of the decision of teenage 
boys of staying longer in school on that of teenage girls. Our estimates suggest that an 
increase of 1 percentage point of male graduation rates raises female probability of 
completing high school by about 0.7-0.8 percentage points. A series of robustness checks, 
including comparisons across different age groups and with different definitions of the 
comparison areas, suggest that the rise was due to the earthquake-related exemption, rather 
than other factors. 
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. 1 Introduction1
The role of peers for individual schooling performances is a widely investigated issue
(Hoxby (2000), Angrist and Lang (2004), Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin (2001),
Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Kremer, Miguel and Thornton (2004))2. The ex-
istence of peer eﬀects has implications for the correct assessment of a number of issues:
competition among private and public schools, school-ﬁnance and control systems3, ability
tracking4, desegregation programs such as Metco, Moving to Opportunity, etc.5.
We contribute to the literature on peer eﬀects by providing evidence on the causal
eﬀect of the schooling achievement of young men on those of young women. Identiﬁcation
hinges on an exogenous shock to the probability of boys of graduating from high school.
We exploit the exemption from compulsory military service (CMS) granted to few speciﬁc
cohorts of males living in southern Italy as a result of an earthquake hitting this area in
1We are indebted to Josh Angrist, David Card and Antonio Ciccone for their detailed comments and
suggestions at various stages of this project. We also thank Andrea Brandolini, Ken Chay, Federico
Cingano, Armin Falk, Andrea Ichino, Juan Jimeno, Brian Krauth, Marco Magnani, Matthias Messner,
Monica Paiella, Sevi Rodriguez-Mora, Enrico Moretti, Jesse Rothstein, Emmanuel Saez, Gilles Saint-Paul,
Alessandro Secchi, Roberto Torrini, Fabrizio Venditti, and seminar participants at the Banﬀ Workshop
on Experimental and Non-Experimental Evaluations of Peer Group and Other Eﬀects, Bank of Italy,
European University Institute, IZA-Bonn, University of California at Berkeley, University of Padua,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2004 Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2003 EEA-ESEM, 2003
EALE, 2003 AIEL. We also thank Manuela Brunori, Lt. C. Pietro Canale, Angela Cheche, Federico
Giorgi, Giovanni Iuzzolino, Federica Lagna, Maurizio Lucarelli, Raﬀaella Nizzi, Simona Paci, Giovanni
Seri, Carla Tolu for providing and helping us with the data and the legal aspects. We are the sole
responsible for any mistake. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the
Bank of Italy. Correspondence: Research Department, Bank of Italy, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 - Roma -
Italy. Email: piero.cipollone@bancaditalia.it, alfonso.rosolia@bancaditalia.it
2A growing body of empirical literature has documented the existence of such peer eﬀects in many
ﬁelds other than schooling. Among others, Case and Katz (1991), Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman
(1996), Falk and Ichino (2003), Falk and Fischbacher (2002), Grinblatt, Keloharju and Ikaheimo (2004),
Duﬂo and Saez (2003), Miguel and Kremer (2004), Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000), Katz,
Kling and Liebman (2001), Lalive (2003), Ichino and Maggi (2000), Topa (2001), Gaviria and Raphael
(2001).
3Epple and Romano (1998), Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King and Kremer (2002), Hsieh and Urquiola
(2003), Winston and Zimmerman (2003).
4Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002), Figlio and Page (2002), Hanushek and Woessmann (2005).
5Katz et al. (2001), Ludwig, Duncan and Hirschﬁeld (2001), Angrist and Lang (2004).8
1980. The exemption is shown to have increased boys’ high school graduation rates by
more than 2 percentage points. Graduation rates of girls belonging to the same cohorts
as exempt boys increased by about 2 percentage points. Since in Italy women are not
subject to military draft we argue that the change in their schooling achievements is the
reaction to the schooling behavior of exempt males. Our estimates suggest these peer
eﬀects are rather strong: a one percentage point increase in males’ graduation rates raises
females’ by 0.7-0.8 percentage points.
Peer eﬀects may stem either from strategic complementarities in outcomes or from ex-
ternalities based on individual exogenous characteristics6. The baseline empirical model
of peer eﬀects typically assumes individual outcomes are aﬀected by average peer charac-
teristics (e.g. ability) or outcomes in a linear fashion. In this class of models, the policy
implications are diﬀerent depending on the source of peer eﬀects7. On the one hand, peer
outcomes can be directly manipulated by a policy maker thereby improving aggregate
performance and achieving overall eﬃciency gains. On the other, peer characteristics are
given and can only be redistributed across groups. This implies any increase of someone’s
average peer quality comes at the cost of a reduction of the same amount of someone else’s
6Individuals belonging to a given population may display similar schooling achievements for various
reasons. It may be because they share the same environmental characteristics (same school infrastructure,
teachers quality, etc.) or because they are sorted according to some individual, possibly unobservable,
characteristic (parental education, ability, etc.). Finally, they may display similar achievements because
of some externality at play within the population (Manski (1993) and Moﬃtt (2001) discuss the diﬃculties
involved in identifying such external eﬀects). These may be in turn grouped into two main categories,
that Manski (1993) deﬁned as contextual and endogenous eﬀects. On the one hand, these external eﬀects
may stem from some exogenous characteristic of the population. For example, average parental education
in a given class may aﬀect individual outcomes because children do homework together and beneﬁt from
their classmates’ parents’ human capital through the help received when studying. Alternatively, external
eﬀects may arise from individual outcomes. For example, if some students do better they may help their
classmates or they free up more teacher time to be devoted to more needy students. Another possibility
is that doing well or poorly in school may become a social norm of a given population, to which members
conform (Akerlof and Kranton (2002)).
7See Hoxby (2000) for a discussion of the issue.9
average peer quality thereby leaving unchanged their overall average outcome. However,
the previous literature has been unable to disentangle these two sources because peer out-
comes are generally instrumented with group composition (Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman
(2003), Hoxby (2000), Angrist and Lang (2004), Hanushek et al. (2001))8. In our setting
the underlying exogenous characteristics of the group of peers (the boys) are unlikely to
be modiﬁed by the instrument, thereby ensuring that we identify the response of girls’
schooling outcomes to boys’ schooling outcomes rather than to boys’ characteristics.
Our results are based on comparisons of the schooling attainments of exempt and not
exempt cohorts belonging to the least damaged towns and those of comparable cohorts
in nearby towns not hit by the quake. The identiﬁcation strategy is similar in spirit to
those exploited in recent works by Duﬂo and Saez (2003), Miguel and Kremer (2004)
and Kremer et al. (2004). In these works, identiﬁcation of the strength of peer eﬀects is
achieved by means of a partial-population intervention, that is by studying how the treat-
ment status of well-identiﬁed individuals in a given group aﬀects outcomes of untreated
individuals in the same group. Duﬂo and Saez (2003) run an experiment where only some
individuals randomly selected within certain university departments of a North-American
university are informed about an advertisement fair concerning a retirement scheme. They
ﬁnd strong social eﬀects as concerns fair attendance which in turn reﬂect on the decision
to join the advertised savings program. Miguel and Kremer (2004) study externalities to
medical treatments in subsaharan Africa. Identiﬁcation is based on a randomized school-
based mass treatment with deworming drugs. They show that the deworming program
8An alternative approach is developed in Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2002) and related works.
It consists in comparing individual and aggregateestimated coeﬃcients or in analyzing the spatial variance
of the phenomena of interest (Glaeser et al. (1996)). See Manski (2000) and Moﬃtt (2001) for a review
of the diﬀerent approaches.10
substantially improved outcomes (school attendance and health status) of untreated chil-
dren. Kremer et al. (2004) is closest to our paper. They evaluate the eﬀects of a merit
scholarship program on adolescent girls’ academic exam scores. They ﬁnd girls’ scores
increased signiﬁcantly in schools randomly selected for the program; positive eﬀects of
the program are also found on test scores of boys, ineligible for the awards, and of lower
achieving girls, unlikely to win the award.
We also contribute to the literature that quantiﬁes the eﬀects of military conscription
on schooling. Previous studies have mainly focused on the causal relationship between
subsequent earnings and veteran status (Angrist and Krueger (1989), Angrist (1990),
Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995)). To our knowledge, only Angrist and Krueger (1992)
and Card and Lemieux (2001) address an issue similar to ours showing that draft avoidance
behaviors increased college enrollment and graduation rates of potential draftees in the
Vietnam-era suggesting that absent conscription college enrollment rates would be lower.
This is only apparently in contrast with our ﬁndings since, diﬀerently from ours, in their
setting serving in the military would generally imply being sent to war.
An approximate idea of the potential aggregate impact of such peer eﬀects in terms
of per capita GDP can be obtained from recent OECD estimates of the elasticity of
steady-state per capita GDP to average years of education (OECD (2003)). Our results
suggest that a permanent increase of 1 percentage point of male high-school graduation
rates would permanently raise per capita GDP by about one fourth of a percentage point;
neglecting the eﬀect of male schooling on girls’ would underestimate the increase by about
as much as one tenth of a percentage point. Our ﬁndings also magnify the social returns
to education implied by recent estimates of the causal eﬀects of schooling on various11
relevant outcomes identiﬁed in recent years (Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Moretti (2004),
Lochner and Moretti (2004), Bresnahan, Brynjolfssonn and Hitt (2002), Sacerdote (2002),
Currie and Moretti (2003), Lleras-Muney (2005)).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section illustrates the institutional setting:
we brieﬂy describe how CMS works in Italy, motivate why the exemption from CMS
modiﬁes male teenagers’ schooling choices and review the interventions undertaken in the
aftermath of the quake. Section (3) describes the research design and provides elements
in favor of the main identifying assumptions. We then present the main results of the
paper and provide additional robustness checks. Section (6) concludes.
2 The institutional setting
Compulsory military service and schooling choices
Until recently military service was an obligation for all Italian males9. In the early eighties,
the period we are interested in, the length of the service was twelve months10. All boys
would undergo a thorough medical assessment administered by military authorities in
the year they turned 18 to establish their suitability for military service. Upon passing
these medical exams boys would be inducted as they turned 1911. Therefore, the medical
9Women were not allowed to enter military corps, not even on a voluntary basis. In recent years the
obligation has been canceled and military service has become a voluntary service open to both sexes.
10Service would last 18 months if drafted in the Navy. In the late ’90s compulsory service was shortened
to 10 months.
11The reasons for exoneration from service are strictly coded and quite restrictive. They typically
require main physical disabilities or serious mental disorders. They must be ascertained by military
qualiﬁed medical personnel in a thorough three-days visit. Military service could as well be replaced by
civil service under speciﬁc circumstances (conscientious objector status). In the eighties the length of
this alternative service was longer than normal military service (24 months). The draftee would ﬁle a
request for alternative service and after some months he would be called before a military commission to
motivate and defend his request.12
examinations were typically taken during the last year of high school and teenagers were
drafted shortly after12. However, one-year deferments could be obtained under speciﬁc
circumstances by ﬁling a motivated request. In particular, people enrolled in high school
could defer service until they were 22, provided this was enough time for them to be able
to graduate by that age13.
Although CMS is structured in such a way as not to interfere with graduation from high
school it may nonetheless be an impediment and aﬀect the choices of those who are behind
schedule, as they need to ask for deferment. Therefore we expect that the exemption
unexpectedly granted after the quake raised the probability of aﬀected individuals of
completing high school. Let us formally describe the alternatives available to someone
who is eligible to serve (18 or older) but who can also defer service for one year if he stays
in high school (younger than 22). Assume for simplicity that he will live T more periods
and deﬁne w0
t the yearly wage he earns with t periods of labor market experience if he
does not acquire any additional schooling; similarly, let w1
t be the wage earned after t
years of labor market experience if an additional year of schooling has been acquired. His
choice will be based on the comparison between the value of dropping out, serving and
then entering the labor market, U0 = M +
PT−1
0 w0
t, and the value of deferring service
12In the period under examination, the Italian educational track was based on three diﬀerent levels of
education. A basic level, compulsory for everybody, that included 8 grades and was usually completed by
age 14. Upon completing the ﬁrst level youths decided whether to enroll in high school, which consisted
of 5 grades and was usually completed by age 19. Throughout these grades students had to be admitted
every year to the next grade. In case they failed, they had to repeat the grade failed and thus lagged
behind one year. Up to high school there were virtually no fees to be paid, thus the only costs involved
were foregone earnings and expenditures such as books and other material. Graduation from high school
required passing a nationally administered exam. Upon passing this test students could freely enroll into
college, the third level of education, that theoretically lasted anything between 4 (e.g. economics, law)
and 6 years (e.g. medicine, engineering) depending on the subject. People that lagged behind in college
were penalized by higher yearly enrollment fees.
13For example, a 19-year-old individual enrolled in the 2nd year of high school will not be allowed to
defer service since by age 22 he will at best reach the 4th year (of a ﬁve year program).13




S is a measure of the period cost/gain of spending one year in school and M is the
period cost/gain of spending it in service14. He will drop out and serve in the military if
PT−1
0 w0
t > S +
PT−2
0 w1
t. Assume now an alternative setting where there is no obligation
to serve. In this simple framework this additional year can be spent either in school or in
the labor market. To see how alternatives change, it is enough to substitute M with w0
T
in the expression for U0 and with w1
T−1 in U1; that is, the values of earnings in the last
period of life that, as such, embeds all the previous labor market experience. Provided
the returns to an additional year of education are higher than those to an additional year
of labor market experience (w1
T−1 > w0
T), absent CMS the incentives to stay in school
increase15.
The earthquake-related interventions
Figure (1) shows the area of southern Italy hit by a major earthquake in November 1980;
the area hosted more than 5 million people, about 10 percent of the Italian population,
spread over 650 towns. Shortly after the quake Parliament precisely deﬁned the area to be
considered as damaged and to be targeted by relief measures; they also deﬁned the amount
14We neglect discounting to keep notation simple. The basic argument still holds. In particular, under
mild conditions it can be shown that the incentive to stay in school increases provided the diﬀerence
between returns to schooling and those to experience is larger than the discount rate. We also assume
for simplicity that there is no retirement decision.
15It could be argued that deferring service has a value of its own. For example, in the Vietnam era,
success in deferring the draft would sensibly increase the probability of not going to war. In Holland
service might be deferred because one expects a mass exemption (Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995)).
In Italy, as we have detailed above, military service was compulsory and high school students had to
serve by the age of 22. Therefore, deferring the draft would not increase the probability of not serving
or of being included in mass exemptions. Moreover, there is no incentive in deferring service to avoid
a military conﬂict since Italy has not been in war over the past 60 years and peace-keeping missions
(Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, etc.) are generally run by volunteers and professionals.14
and guidelines for the assignment of the funds allocated to this purpose16. Entitlement
to ﬁnancial aids depended on the magnitude of the damages suﬀered as certiﬁed by the
authorities; no money accrued to municipalities where no family had suﬀered damage.
Parliament also passed a set of laws that modiﬁed and eventually canceled the obligation
to serve in the military for all males born before 1966 who were living in the relevant area
as of November 198017. Although the exemption was eventually granted to all males born
before 1966, it had an uneven impact on the high school graduation rate of the diﬀerent
cohorts because of the interplay between the dates at which the relevant laws were passed
and the time when each cohort was supposed to serve. Males born before 1962 were
largely out of high school by the time they received the exemption, either because they
had completed it or because they had dropped out. Males born in 1962 were exempted
at age 20. A non-trivial share of them were still in high school at that age (in 1979 at
the national level almost 6 percent). Therefore the exemption could have had an eﬀect
on their high school graduation probability. Finally, the cohorts born between 1963 and
1965 learned about the exemption while they were still in school. Therefore most of the
eﬀect of the exemption should be detected in the high school graduation rate of students
born between 1963 and 1965.
16An amount of about 12 billion dollars at 2003 prices and exchange rate (roughly 17 percent of the
1980 GDP of the area hit by the quake) was budgeted for recovery over the period 1981-1983. About 80
percent of the sum was targeted to rebuilding private dwellings and public buildings. The remaining 20
percent was devoted to the reconstruction of factories, farms and basic infrastructures.
17Law No. 219/81 passed on May 14th 1981 gave to all males born between 1963 and 1965 the oppor-
tunity to comply with their military obligations by serving as civilians in alternative services active in
the earthquake region; law No. 187/82 passed on April 29th 1982 completely removed the obligation to
serve in the army for all males born before 1964; law No. 80/84 passed on April 18th 1984 extended the
military exemption to males born before 1966 (Cipollone and Rosolia (2004)).15
3 The research design
Identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect of male high school graduation rates on the probability
of girls completing high school requires that the exogenous shifter of boys’ schooling
attainments be not a direct determinant of women’ success in graduating. Exemption
from CMS is a candidate instrument: while aﬀecting the incentives to stay in school for
males, it does not directly enter females’ choices since they are not subject to drafting.
However, two features of the exemption might hamper its validity as an instrument.
First, it was caused by the 1980 earthquake, which generally led to disruptions of eco-
nomic life and government interventions that potentially altered individual schooling at-
tainments18. In this case the exemption would not be a valid instrument because of the
correlation with a shock that directly aﬀected the schooling of both males and females.
This is a serious concern because in many towns the quake was quite disruptive. For
example, according to the oﬃcial damage assessment there were around 2,000 deaths,
mostly in the epicentre, 10,000 injured and around 300,000 people in need of shelter; 60
percent of the houses in the epicentre were destroyed or severely damaged and 33 percent
required structural intervention to restore habitability; outside the epicentre there were
less damages but still 20 percent of the houses was inhabitable and structural interven-
tion was required for another 30 percent. These direct shocks along with the subsequent
income transfers and other quake-induced relief measures probably had a direct impact
on the choice or the possibility of staying in school of the younger cohorts. Second, the
exemption is age-speciﬁc so that any other cohort-speciﬁc shock to schooling outcomes
18For example, children may have not attended school for some time or households may have received
income transfers.16
may act as a confounding factor.
To break the correlation between the exemption from CMS and other quake-related
shocks that might directly aﬀect individual schooling we limit our attention to towns
that, albeit targeted by quake-related interventions, were the least aﬀected by the earth-
quake according to the oﬃcial evaluations performed by the government in the aftermath
(henceforth, treated towns). Treated towns in our sample therefore only include those
located at the boundary of the earthquake area as deﬁned by the government, the far-
thest away from the epicenter, but still in the area exempt from military service. There
are 57 of these towns, with a population of about 300,000 people at the end of 1979; 18
out of 57 towns, although included in the area oﬃcially involved in the quake, recorded
no damage; 15 towns ranked at the very lowest level of the damage scale, meaning only
very mild and limited damage was suﬀered; the next 15 towns ranked below the median
damage score and the remaining ones were slightly above19. As a whole, treated towns
were largely unaﬀected by the earthquake and therefore by quake-related interventions
other than the age-sex speciﬁc exemption.
To control for cohort speciﬁc shocks we compare the evolution of cohort schooling at-
tainments in treated towns with that of schooling attainments of comparable cohorts in
towns just outside the earthquake region and neighbouring on at least one treated town
(henceforth, control towns). This rule selects 60 more towns, with a total population of
about 600,000 people at the end of 1979. The ﬁnal sample therefore includes 117 towns
belonging to 12 provinces of 5 regions with a total population of about 900,000 people at
the end of 1979 (Figure 2).
19Additional details are provided in Cipollone and Rosolia (2004).17
The upper panel of ﬁgure (3) reports the share of males who completed high school in
a given cohort in treated and control towns. Data are drawn from the 1991 population
census, 11 years after the quake. Therefore the youngest cohort potentially aﬀected by
the exemption from CMS is aged 26 and far beyond high school. Cohorts not involved
in the exemption (born earlier than 1962) display similar schooling levels in treated and
control towns. The share of high school graduates rises steadily from about 20 percent up
to 35 percent for those until the cohort born in 1955. The rise comes to a halt for people
born between 1961 and 1955. The two time series diverge clearly for younger cohorts,
born between 1963 and 1965. While young men in control towns display more or less the
same achievement as older cohorts, those in treated towns, exempt from CMS, display
a strong increase in high school graduation rates, from about 34 to 38 percent. Turning
to women, except for a stronger trend, the pattern closely tracks that for males: older
women graduate from high school at the same rate in treated and control towns. But a
larger share of women born between 1963 and 1965 graduated from high school in towns
where men were exempted from CMS.
Identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the exemption requires that any direct eﬀect of the earth-
quake on individual schooling was the same across the two groups of towns. Geographic
proximity supports this assumption. For example, if after the earthquake people decided
it was too dangerous to send their children to school for a few weeks, this would pre-
sumably have happened in both treated and control towns. However, although the direct
eﬀects of the earthquake may be reasonably assumed to be the same on the grounds of ge-
ographic proximity, only the oﬃcially listed towns qualiﬁed for government intervention.
Interventions were linked to the oﬃcial damage index, and treated towns were generally18
at the low end of the damage scale, thus at best qualifying only for limited help. To
allay concerns that the main ﬁndings are driven by some omitted intervention, robustness
checks will also be performed on the subset of exempt towns that did not record any
damage whatsoever or were at the very bottom of the oﬃcial damage scale and their
neighboring towns.
Geographical proximity also implies that treated and control towns are embedded in
the same economic environment, so that any market interaction that could possibly bias
the results is taken care of. For example, since these individuals work in broadly the
same labor markets, any cohort-sex (possibly quake-related) speciﬁc labor market shock
is controlled for. Thus, if the earthquake brought about an increase in the high school wage
premium in the local market (for example, because a more skilled labor force was needed
for reconstruction) this would have aﬀected in the same way the choices of comparable
individuals in the control towns. By the same token, if the net beneﬁts of completing
high school went down because of an increase in college attendance costs (say, the closest
colleges were damaged), they decreased equally in both groups of towns since individuals
in neighboring towns may access the same set of colleges.
Table (1) compares several characteristics of treated and control towns. Treated towns
turn out to be higher on the sea level, less densely inhabited and smaller. In the econo-
metric speciﬁcation these features are picked up by town ﬁxed eﬀects; however, robustness
checks will also be conducted on samples ridden of the larger towns driving the above dif-
ferences. Pre-treatment migration behaviour is not statistically diﬀerent between treated
and control towns, but treated towns display slightly lower birth and higher death rates,19
the net eﬀect being a lower population growth rate in treated towns.20. This may partly
explain the higher average age found in treated towns; the average family size also turns
out to be very similar. As concerns the population older than 15, described in panel C of
the table, educational attainments, employment and unemployment rates are the same;
individuals in treated towns are however more likely to be self-employed21. While there
seem to be no diﬀerences in terms of education and labor market status when considering
town population as a whole, one would like to make sure that the same holds true for
the parents of the cohorts underlying the analysis. The sample underlying table (2) is all
individuals that, in the 1981 population census where living in any of the towns in the
sample and had a child of age between 16 and 25, the cohorts we focus upon. While there
is no guarantee that these are the speciﬁc parents of the individuals in our ﬁnal sample,
previous evidence on pre-treatment mobility ﬂows mitigates concern that between quake
and the subsequent census major and diﬀerential changes in the population of treated
and control towns had taken place22. The table reports results of regressions of parents
employment, unemployment and self-employemnt rates as well as their educational at-
tainments on a set of dummies for the age of the child and their interaction with the
treatment dummy. While in some cases these diﬀerences are never signiﬁcant, in others
20To test that these diﬀerences are systematic over time we regressed birth and death rates and pop-
ulation inﬂow and outﬂow rates for the available pre-treatment years (1972-1980) on a full set of time
dummies and their interactions with the treatment dummy and tested that all interacted coeﬃcients are
equal. The tests never reject the null.
21Data are drawn from the 1981 census. This is the only data source close enough in time to treatment
date with information on population characteristics. Although strictly speaking the census is run after
treatment the research design makes us conﬁdent that no major changes were brought about by the
quake. Moreover, while the census was run in October 1981, the bulk of the laws canceling the obligation
to serve were passed after that date.
22We also veriﬁed mobility from the 1981 census; we regressed a dummy equal to one if child birthplace
was diﬀerent from residence in 1976 (as reported in a recall question in the census) on dummies for age
and a dummy for the quake and found small and not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the relevant
cohorts. Results were basically the same when looking at 1981 residence.20
they turn out to be. However, F-tests that these diﬀerences in parental characteristics
are constant across cohorts never rejecet the null. Once again, town ﬁxed eﬀects should
account for this heterogeneity. Still, our speciﬁcations will include these characteristics in
the information set.
Several authors have shown the importance of class size, pupils-teacher ratios and in
general per-capita resources devoted to schooling for individual school outcomes (Card
and Krueger (1992), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger (1999), Krueger and Whitmore
(2001))23. Table (3) reports the average class size in control and treated towns in pri-
mary, secondary and high school for the available pre-treatment school years. Statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in primary and secondary schools signal smaller classes in treated
towns. However, in both cases the null that these diﬀerences are constant over time can-
not be rejected. In the econometric speciﬁcation, town ﬁxed eﬀects absorb systematic
diﬀerences in endowments across towns while (a quadratic of) cohort size will account
for changing per-capita resources within town. However, since diﬀerences are concen-
trated in lower grades (primary and secondary schools), to dissipate doubts that the main
ﬁndings are driven by diﬀerences in pre-treatment schooling attainments determined by
diﬀerent school environments, we will perform robustness checks that explicitly control
for schooling attainments in secondary school.
To further ensure that the diﬀerences in school outcomes seen in ﬁgure (3) are due to
the exemption and not to confounding factors aﬀecting both boys’ and girls’ schooling we
perform two additional falsiﬁcation exercises. First, we assign treatment status to control
towns and exemption status to cohorts 26-28 from those towns and compare schooling
23See Hanushek (2003) for a critical review of the main results in this literature.21
achievements with those of towns also outside the quake region (henceforth, outer control
towns; see ﬁgure (2)) and neighboring on control towns. Second, we assign exemption
status to cohorts aged 30-35 in 1991 in treated towns (indeed our control cohorts) and
compare their high school graduation rates across treated and control towns with that of
older cohorts aged 36-40 in 1991. Our results turn out to be robust to both exercises: we
ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the schooling achievements of the fake treatment groups.
4 Results
We are interested in assessing the eﬀect of male high school graduation rates on the
probability of a girl belonging to the same group graduating from high school:
y
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c + ￿icj (1)
where yF
icj = 1 if girl i of cohort c in town j graduated and zero otherwise; xicj are
individual controls; yM
cj is the share of males with at least a high school degree in cohort c
town j; µF
j and νF
c are, respectively a town and a cohort ﬁxed eﬀect and ￿icj an i.i.d. shock.
The model determining girls’ school attainment laid out in equation (1) rests on the
assumption that the relevant group for the kind of interaction eﬀect we are after (θ) is
the set of people belonging to the same cohort and born in the same town. In our sample
these are small groups, because sampled towns are generally small24. The size of the
median group in the sample is 45, only about twice the average high school class size
(see table (3)). The small town size implies that these people have most likely known
24A municipality is the smallest oﬃcial territorial unit in Italy. The country is divided into about 8,100
of them, with an average extension of 37 square kilometers. The median population is about 2,300 and
the 75th centile is only 5,200.22
each other since childhood. They went to the same school in the early stages of their
education: in our sample there are on average 5 primary and 1.5 secondary schools per
town and respectively 8 and 9 classes per school. The structure of the Italian education
system is such that most of one’s classmates in the ﬁrst year of a given grade (primary,
secondary, high school) will move together along the educational track up to the last year.
This means they spend four to six hours a day, six days a week together for eight years.
Moreover, the small size of the towns considerably raises the chances of getting to know
peers who are not classmates25. In this respect, this deﬁnition of group seems to be able
to capture productive externalities at work in the classroom as well as role models and
information transmitted by peers other than classmates26.
Direct evidence on the importance of peer interactions can be obtained from the 1998
wave of the Istat’s Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie, soggetti sociali e condizioni dell’infanzia
(Istat (1998)), a multi-purpose survey that periodically collects information on about
21,000 households focusing on various aspects of family life27. The 1998 wave includes a
special section on people younger than 18 where information on schooling, leisure time and
social relationships are collected. As expected, teenagers go out very often (90 percent go
out several times a week); virtually everybody meets friends several times a week; three
quarters happen to go out with no particular purpose a few times a week (for example,
they take a walk down to the main square); they also go out with deﬁnite purposes: eat
25Additionally, in Italy driver’s licenses can be obtained only after turning 18 so that geographic
mobilty of Italian teenagers is often very limited, more so in the area and years relevant for this paper,
thus reinforcing the assumption that most of one’s social life at this age takes place in one’s hometown
26The deﬁnition of the relevant group is a fundamental issue in studies addressing peer and social
eﬀects. Manski (1993) shows how a mistaken deﬁnition may lead to tautological models. Another source
of concern is that focusing on a superset of the true group may underestimate the strength of local
interactions if they become more diluted with some measure of distance.
27This survey is similar to the Canadian General Social Survey.23
out, have a drink, go dancing or see a football match (60 percent at least once a week);
they also go very often to parties thrown by others (60 percent go to more than 3 parties
in a month). Last, these interactions do not appear to be gender speciﬁc: about 40 per-
cent of Southern Italian girls and 34 percent of boys spend their time equally with boys
and girls28.
We draw data on completed schooling from the 1991 population census. Ideally, the
sample should include individuals living as of November 1980 in any of the 117 selected
towns. However, the census only provides place of birth and place of residence at census
date. We therefore proxy the place of residence in November 1980 with place of birth and
select all the individuals born in any of the sampled towns. This amounts to assuming that
the cohorts relevant to our analysis, aged 15 to 24 in 1980, were living in their towns of
birth at the time of the earthquake29. Pre- and post-quake mobility could bias the results
if the propensity to move were correlated with schooling attainment and diﬀered between
control and treated towns. For example, people from treated towns could have moved
(possibly because of the quake) to towns with better schools and this would improve
attainments of both boys and girls. However, aggregate inﬂows and outﬂows of treated
and control towns are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent over the 70s and 80s.
More in general, the 1991 census does not provide any individual control as of 1980,
and it cannot be matched with previous census waves to infer information on background
characteristics at the individual level (parental education, labor market status, etc.). We
28The population underlying the ﬁgures reported is people aged 14 to 17 and living in southern Italy
(about 1,500 observations). Unfortunately we do not know the size of the town where they live so that we
cannot provide evidence as concerns this subpopulation which would be closer to the one in our sample.
29Italian youths are known to live with their parents much longer than those of any other country
(Manacorda and Moretti (forthcoming), Giuliano (2004), Becker, Bentolila, Fernandes and Ichino (2005)).
In the eighties, also because of worse labor market conditions, this was even more common.24
therefore look at the eﬀect of boys’ high school graduation rate on that of girls in the














Equation (2) is estimated on cohorts born between 1956 and 1965 (age 26 to 35 in 1991)
in one of the 117 sampled towns30. Exempt cohorts are those aged 26 to 28. Boys’ high
school graduation rate yM
cj is instrumented with the exemption from CMS, a dummy equal
to one if town j is in the quake region and cohort c is aged 26-28 in 1991.
Table (4) reports ﬁrst stage and reduced form estimates of the eﬀect of the exemption
on boys’ and girls’ high school graduation rates and IV estimates of θ in equation (2)
for several speciﬁcations of the information set. The ﬁrst row corresponds to a baseline
speciﬁcation that only allows for cohort dummies and town ﬁxed eﬀects. First stage
results show that the exemption raised boys’ high school graduation rates by about 1.8
percentage points; even in this basic speciﬁcation the eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. Reduced form estimates show that girls of the same age living in the same towns
as exempt boys also had a 1.25 percentage point higher probability of completing high
school; the eﬀect on girls is however less precisely estimated. The implied causal eﬀect of
boys’ graduation rate on girls’ is about 0.7, meaning that raising boys’ completion rates by
1 percentage point increases girls’ by around 0.7 percentage points. The Anderson-Rubin
test rejects the null of a zero eﬀect with a 9 percent signiﬁcance31.
The previous speciﬁcation assumes all diﬀerences across towns are absorbed by town
30We exclude the cohort born in 1962 (age 29 in 1991). Their age when the relevant law was issued is
such that it is hard to make assumptions on whether and how they were aﬀected.
31The Anderson-Rubin test has the correct size when the model is just-identiﬁed independently of the
strength of the ﬁrst stage (Moreira (2001)).25
ﬁxed eﬀects. The evidence discussed above shows that either diﬀerences across towns
in parental characteristics and school endowments are not statistically signiﬁcant or that
they are systematic over time and cohorts. The next two rows of table (4) show that results
are robust to the introduction of explicit controls for these sources of heterogeneity across
towns and cohorts.
The second row of table (4) reports result for a speciﬁcation that accounts for diﬀerences
in school endowments across cohorts. While a large body of literature has shown class size
is a determinant of individual school performance (Card and Krueger (1992), Angrist and
Lavy (1999), Krueger (1999), Krueger and Whitmore (2001)) we cannot assign to each
town-cohort a speciﬁc measure of class size since the available information is at town-
grade level. Still, we can control for cohort size. Given the limited age interval spanned
by the sample (9 subsequent cohorts) and the reasonably slow evolution of structural
school endowments most of the relevant variability is cross-sectional and is thus captured
by town ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, cohort size should proxy reasonably well for measures
of school congestion or the availability of per-capita resources for a speciﬁc cohort over
time. Indeed, Card and Lemieux (2000) ﬁnd that larger cohorts have lower educational
attainment, possibly because of supply eﬀects. The information set is augmented with a
second order polynomial in cohort size. First stage and reduced form results point to a
stronger and more signiﬁcant eﬀect of the exemption: boys’ graduation rates increased by
2.5 percentage points; girls’ by 1.8 percentage point. The implied causal eﬀect is basically
unchanged but much more precisely estimated with a p-value of 1.4 percent.
The third row of table (4) further expands the information set by including controls for
parental labor market status and education as described above in table (2). In particular,26
we include the share of parents employed, unemployed and self-employed and the shares
of parents who completed high-school and university.
Inclusion of these controls does not modiﬁy the results. The exemption raised boys’ high
school completion rates by more than 2 percentage points; the share of girls completing
high school increased by 1.8 points. Incidentally, tests of joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcents
on the quadratic in cohort size and the set of parental controls in the ﬁrst stage and
reduced form equations strongly reject the null. The IV estimate now yields a slightly
higher and still statistically signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of about 0.8; the null of no peer eﬀect
is rejected with 1.4 percent signiﬁcance.
Taken together, these results imply that in treated towns about 180 adolescent boys and
150 girls completed high school because of the exemption from CMS who would otherwise
have dropped out. We thus contribute to the literature by stressing that, apart from
military service itself and the implied loss of labor market experience (Angrist (1990),
Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995), etc.), the existence of compulsory drafting may aﬀect
subsequent male earnings also because of lower educational attainments. Also, we show
that the negative eﬀects of CMS on schooling extends to women, even if they are not
subject to drafting, and potentially to their subsequent earnings as well.
5 Robustness checks
We now turn to a set of falsiﬁcation exercises and robustness checks. We start by showing
that the results introduced in the previous section are not just a chance occurrence by
looking for similar eﬀects in alternative samples. Next, we show they are robust to27
alternative sample speciﬁcations. Last, we provide additional elements showing that no
other quake-related shock or pre-treatment diﬀerences in schooling drive the main results.
To allay concerns that the observed change in schooling among younger exempt cohorts
is a spurious one we perform two falsiﬁcation exercises. First, we compare schooling
achievements of cohorts born in control towns and those of cohorts born in towns just
outside the control ring (outer control towns, see ﬁgure (2)). Both groups are certainly
unaﬀected by any quake-related intervention. We assign treatment status to control towns;
therefore, the exemption dummy equals unity for cohorts aged 26-28 born in control towns
and zero otherwise. Results reported in the ﬁrst row of panel A in table (5) show no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence suggesting that the results of table (4) are unlikely to
be driven by sampling variation. Moreover, since control towns are closer to the quake
region than outer control towns, the ﬁndings provide further support to the assumption
that direct eﬀects of the quake were absent: outcomes of younger cohorts not exempt are
the same as those of comparable cohorts farther away from the quake region. Second,
we assign exemption status to cohorts aged 30-35 in 1991 in treated towns and compare
high school graduation rates of cohorts aged 30-40 in 1991 in treated towns to the same
cohorts of control towns; the exemption dummy now equals unity for cohorts aged 30-35
and born in treated towns and zero otherwise. Results reported in the second row of
panel A again show no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Third, we replicate the above
exercise only on cohorts aged 30-35 and assigning exemption status to those aged 30-32
and born in treated towns. Results, reported in the third row of panel A, again do not
show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in schooling attainemnts. We conclude that the ﬁndings of the
previous section are unlikely to be driven by speciﬁc schooling trends in treated towns.28
Interpretation of an IV estimate of θ as a causal eﬀect requires a minimal set of as-
sumptions to be satisﬁed (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)). In particular, that female
education in a given group does not react to the treatment status of other groups, that
is neighboring towns or cohorts (stable unit treatment value)32. While the evidence we
have provided about interactions among teenagers suggests it is a valid assumption as far
as other towns are concerned, it might be more questionable as concerns the treatment
status of neighboring cohorts. Panel B1 of table (5) reports a set of robustness checks
where alternative deﬁnitions of the older cohorts have been experimented. The previous
ﬁndings are conﬁrmed. The exemption increased boys’ high school graduation rates by
about 2 percentage points and those of girls by around 1.8 percentage points although
results seem to be more sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the age control group. The implied
causal eﬀect, always statistically signiﬁcant, ranges between 07 and 0.933.
While assignment to treatment can be thought of as random since it depends on being
aﬀected by the quake, tables (1) showed some diﬀerences across treated and control towns:
control towns are on average larger and more densely populated than treated towns. In
panel B2 we show the main ﬁndings are robust to the exclusion of larger towns according
to various deﬁnitions. The eﬀect on boys’ and girls’ graduation rates are slightly larger and
still statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated causal eﬀect seems to increase as average town
32Angrist et al. (1996) show that along with the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA) assumption,
a causal interpretation of the estimates requires that (a) assignment to treatment is random, (b) the
instrument does not directly aﬀect the outcome variable (exclusion restriction), (c) nonzero average
causal eﬀect of the instrument on the treatment, (d) the instrument either increases or leaves unaﬀected
the treatment (monotonicity). In our framework, (a) is naturally satisﬁed since assignment to treatment
depends on the quake, (b) is fulﬁlled since women are not subject to drafting and the research design
excludes or controls for the possibility of other quake-related shocks, (c) will be shown to hold in the next
section, (d) has theoretical foundations and empirical support (Angrist and Imbens (1995), Cipollone and
Rosolia (2004)).
33A referee also raised concerns that our main results might be sensitive to the inclusion of some speciﬁc
older cohorts. These results show this is not the case.29
size shrinks, which is consistent with the idea that the underlying mechanism becomes
stronger the smaller the group34.
To lend further credibility to the main identifying assumption that no other quake-
related shock beyond the exemption aﬀected younger cohorts in treated towns we perform
two exercises. First, we limit the sample only to those towns that qualiﬁed for the military
exemption although they did not record any damage at all, and towns that were ranked
at the lowest damage level by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs (their damage score was
6). This leaves us with 33 treated towns; as a control group we retained only those towns
neighbouring on one of the selected treated ones (41 towns); this selection rule shrinks
the sample to 74 towns, mostly southern and eastern ones with respect to the original
sample. Results reported in the ﬁrst row of panel C1 of table (5) show a stronger eﬀect
of the exemption on both boys’ and girls’ graduation rates in this speciﬁc subsample:
boys’ completion rates increase by 3.8 percentage points, those of girls go up by 3.3
percentage points; the implied causal eﬀect is in line with previous results and highly
signiﬁcant. Results are conﬁrmed if we further limit the sample to towns that, although
exempt, were not included in the list of damaged towns (18 towns) and their neighbors
(19 towns). Boys’ graduation rates in this sample increased by 3.9 percentage points while
girls’ did by 3.2 points; the estimated causal eﬀect is again unaltered and although less
precisely estimated, still diﬀerent from zero at 3 percent signiﬁcance. Second, we look
at university graduation rates on the full sample of 117 towns. If any income transfer
was responsible for the increase of high school graduation rates in younger cohorts we
would expect some eﬀect in graduation rates from university of older cohorts as well. We
34In a diﬀerent setting, Duﬂo and Saez (2003) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of treatment on the treated is no
larger than that on untreated individuals in the same small group.30
compare men and women university graduation rates for the cohorts aged 30 to 40 in
1991 and allow for a diﬀerential eﬀect for cohorts 30-35, of college age when the quake
hit, in treated towns. Results in panel C2 show these coeﬃcients are small, negative and
not statistically signiﬁcant. We conclude that our main ﬁndings are unlikely to be driven
by quake-related shocks other than the exemption.
Next, we focus on the eﬀects of schooling attainments in lower grades. Table (3) showed
diﬀerences in pre-treatment schooling endowments between treated and control towns.
Our preferred speciﬁcation controls for cohort size, reasonably the main determinant of
per-capita resources given the limited age span considered in the analysis. However, to
verify that the main ﬁndings are not driven by the potentially larger population at risk of
completing high school in treated towns we perform two additional exercises. First, in the
ﬁrst row of panel D in table (5) we augment the preferred speciﬁcation with the share of
people in the cohort who had achieved a secondary school degree by 1981 (as reported by
the 1981 census); the eﬀect of the exemption on boys and girls’ schooling is unchanged and
so is the IV estimate. Second, we regress the conditional high school graduation rate on
the preferred information set. The conditional graduation rate is deﬁned as the share of
high school graduates out of secondary school graduates in the cohort. Again, as showns
in row D2, results turn out to be stable to this extension. We conclude that pre-treatment
school endowments and the higher attainments in lower grades cannot explain the higher
graduation rates from high school observed for boys and girls in the town-cohort cells
aﬀected by the exemption.
Finally, we verify that the main results are not driven by geographic heterogeneity in
the developments of schooling levels. We divide the sample in 5 equally sized groups31
of towns on the basis of their geographic proximity and allow for group speciﬁc sets of
age dummies. Point estimates reported in panel E of table (5) are in line with previous
results with p-values below 3 percent; the IV estimate shows a somewhat higher peer
eﬀect, signiﬁcant at 2 percent. We conclude that the main results are not driven by
geographic heterogeneity in the age pattern of schooling.
6 Concluding remarks.
The existence and the nature of peer eﬀects have been recognized as an important element
to assess the eﬃciency of a given school system, its funding arrangements, the existence
of tracking, etc.
This paper provides evidence of a causal relationship of the high school graduation rate
of boys on the probability of girls of the same age and living in the same town completing
high school. Results are based on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of the
exemption from compulsory military service granted to speciﬁc cohorts of young men as a
result of a quake hitting Southern Italy in 1980 on male and female high school graduation
rates.
The exemption is shown to have increased the share of male high school graduates in the
exempt cohorts by more than 2 percentage points. Women of the same age and born in
the same towns as exempt males also display higher high school completion rates by about
2 percentage points. The estimated eﬀects nearly double when we limit the analysis to
the subset of towns that recorded the mildest damage or no damage at all. The research
design and a set of robustness checks guarantee these results are the consequence of the32
exemption from CMS and not of the quake itself or other quake-related interventions that
alter schooling decisions of both boys and girls.
Since in Italy women are not subject to military service, we interpret this ﬁnding as
evidence of peer eﬀects at the cohort-town level. Moreover, in our setting the exemption
does not change the members of the peer group, the boys of a given cohort in a given town.
Therefore, higher peer average outcome is the result of boys staying longer in school or
of them putting more eﬀort into the accumulation of human capital. Hence, we identify
the eﬀect on teenage girls’ schooling outcomes of a behavior of peers.
This kind of peer eﬀects have crucially diﬀerent policy implications than those of peer
eﬀects working through the exogenous characteristics of peers. For example, in the latter
case an increase in the number of compulsory years of schooling would only raise school
attainments of low achievers since the exogenous characteristics of the cohort are not
changed by the intervention. Alternatively, if peer eﬀects work through behaviors the
same policy would also increase attainment of those not directly aﬀected by the reform
since the average outcome in the cohort increases because of the better performance of
low achievers.33
Figure 1: Exemption from CMS and quake intensity.
Quake intensity
no damage   (53)
low   (313)
medium   (296)
high   (34)
Source: Oﬃcial report on the 1980 earthquake, Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione
Economica (1981).34
Figure 2: Sampled towns.
Sampled towns
Control (C)   (60)
Treated (T)   (57)
Outer Control (OC)  (81)
Source: Oﬃcial report on the 1980 earthquake, Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione
Economica (1981).35



























Source: Authors’ calculations on 1991 census data, Istat (1994).36





Inhabitants per square km (1979) 184.293∗∗ -90.413∗∗
(11.363) (20.218)
Extension (km2) 290.584∗∗ -128.708∗∗
(20.527) (36.524)
B: Demography.
Inﬂow rate 1.960∗∗ -0.268
(0.109) (0.194)
-from abroad 0.178∗∗ -0.004
(0.024) (0.042)




Birth rate 1.635∗∗ -0.175∗∗
(0.032) (0.056)
Death rate 0.802∗∗ 0.098∗
(0.024) (0.042)




C: Education and labor market.
%≥ High school 15.478∗∗ -1.236
(0.722) (1.273)
%≥ University 2.709∗∗ -0.479
(0.155) (0.274)
% Employed 37.423∗∗ 0.769
(0.452) (0.797)
% Unemployed 11.564∗∗ 0.958
(0.400) (0.704)
% Self-Employed 10.302∗∗ 2.470∗
(0.582) (1.027)
Source: Authors’ calculations on town structural characteristics (Istat (1990)), population ﬂows data
(Istat (1980b)) and 1981 population census (Istat (1984)).
Weighted means; weights are town population. Panel C refers to population 15 year old and above.
Standard errors in parentheses. (∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.3
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Table 2: Parental characteristics, 1981.
Employment Unemployment Self-Employment High school University Age
Cohort Control T-C Control T-C Control T-C Control T-C Control T-C Control T-C
26 53.831∗∗ 1.126 6.613∗∗ 2.111∗∗ 17.200∗∗ 3.145∗∗ 7.608∗∗ -1.497∗ 1.926∗∗ -0.314 46.670∗∗ 0.362
(1.475) (2.688) (0.436) (0.795) (0.627) (1.143) (0.333) (0.607) (0.119) (0.218) (0.138) (0.252)
27 51.442∗∗ 3.446 7.050∗∗ 1.638∗ 16.106∗∗ 4.545∗∗ 7.491∗∗ -1.211∗ 1.997∗∗ -0.249 47.739∗∗ 0.302
(1.476) (2.682) (0.437) (0.793) (0.628) (1.141) (0.334) (0.606) (0.119) (0.217) (0.138) (0.251)
28 51.103∗∗ 1.003 6.522∗∗ 2.103∗ 16.624∗∗ 3.152∗∗ 7.002∗∗ -1.350∗ 1.853∗∗ -0.248 48.760∗∗ 0.369
(1.555) (2.841) (0.460) (0.841) (0.661) (1.208) (0.351) (0.642) (0.126) (0.230) (0.146) (0.266)
30 48.203∗∗ 1.203 5.936∗∗ 1.867∗ 16.580∗∗ 3.211∗ 6.632∗∗ -1.456∗ 1.918∗∗ -0.558∗ 50.862∗∗ 0.215
(1.703) (3.037) (0.504) (0.899) (0.724) (1.292) (0.385) (0.686) (0.138) (0.246) (0.159) (0.284)
31 46.948∗∗ 1.285 5.533∗∗ 1.49 16.717∗∗ 2.968∗ 7.011∗∗ -2.064∗∗ 2.110∗∗ -0.579∗ 51.851∗∗ 0.001
(1.815) (3.216) (0.537) (0.952) (0.772) (1.368) (0.410) (0.727) (0.147) (0.260) (0.170) (0.301)
32 44.819∗∗ 1.179 5.355∗∗ 0.627 16.133∗∗ 4.067∗∗ 6.759∗∗ -1.729∗ 1.890∗∗ -0.570∗ 52.890∗∗ 0.209
(1.922) (3.421) (0.569) (1.012) (0.818) (1.455) (0.435) (0.773) (0.156) (0.277) (0.180) (0.320)
33 42.746∗∗ 0.669 5.009∗∗ 0.86 15.821∗∗ 3.157 6.994∗∗ -2.208∗∗ 2.041∗∗ -0.589 53.984∗∗ 0.129
(2.128) (3.785) (0.630) (1.120) (0.905) (1.610) (0.481) (0.855) (0.172) (0.306) (0.199) (0.354)
34 41.296∗∗ 0.546 4.803∗∗ 0.691 16.690∗∗ 2.024 6.944∗∗ -1.498 1.979∗∗ -0.276 54.919∗∗ 0.188
(2.355) (4.128) (0.697) (1.221) (1.002) (1.756) (0.532) (0.933) (0.191) (0.334) (0.221) (0.387)
35 39.531∗∗ -0.405 3.820∗∗ -0.113 17.091∗∗ 2.11 7.534∗∗ -2.263∗ 2.493∗∗ -1.074∗∗ 55.970∗∗ 0.158
(2.534) (4.505) (0.750) (1.333) (1.078) (1.916) (0.573) (1.018) (0.205) (0.365) (0.237) (0.422)
F-test 0.999 0.832 0.962 0.981 0.641 0.995
Source: Authors’ calculations on 1981 population census (Istat (1984)).
Weighted means; weights are number of parents in relevant cell. Standard errors in parentheses.
(∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.38
Table 3: School endowments: class size, 1972-79.
School-year Primary school Secondary school High school
Control T-C Control T-C Control T-C
1972 29.781∗∗ -10.858∗∗ 23.450∗∗ -1.859∗∗ 21.513∗∗ 1.242
(0.944) (1.663) (0.336) (0.592) (0.812) (1.528)
1973 30.331∗∗ -11.817∗∗ 23.009∗∗ -1.881∗∗ 22.492∗∗ -0.464
(0.937) (1.636) (0.333) (0.582) (0.811) (1.501)
1974 28.313∗∗ -10.062∗∗ 22.833∗∗ -1.637∗∗ 23.598∗∗ -1.465
(0.932) (1.630) (0.331) (0.580) (0.800) (1.491)
1975 26.985∗∗ -9.555∗∗ 22.879∗∗ -1.323∗ 23.477∗∗ -1.359
(0.928) (1.635) (0.330) (0.582) (0.796) (1.510)
1976 26.132∗∗ -8.714∗∗ 23.737∗∗ -1.953∗∗ 23.591∗∗ -1.702
(0.923) (1.631) (0.328) (0.580) (0.801) (1.497)
1977 25.924∗∗ -8.779∗∗ 23.847∗∗ -1.853∗∗ 23.634∗∗ -1.551
(0.919) (1.627) (0.327) (0.579) (0.802) (1.535)
1978 25.635∗∗ -8.624∗∗ 23.686∗∗ -1.794∗∗ 23.678∗∗ -1.648
(0.915) (1.624) (0.325) (0.577) (0.788) (1.490)
1979 25.396∗∗ -8.862∗∗ 22.678∗∗ -1.296∗ 23.660∗∗ -1.657
(0.912) (1.622) (0.324) (0.577) (0.809) (1.561)
F-stat 0.51 0.20 0.45
P-value 0.82 0.99 0.87
Source: Authors’ calculations on Istat’s education yearbooks (Istat (1980a)).
Weighted means; weights are town population in relevant year. Standard errors in
parentheses. (∗) signiﬁcant at 5%; (∗∗) signiﬁcant at 1%.39
Table 4: First stage, reduced form and IV estimates.
Dependent variable: Males’ HS Females’ HS
graduation rate graduation rate
OLS IV
First stage Reduced form
Exemption p-value Exemption p-value Males’ HS % p-value
Age & Town dummies 1.82 0.031 1.24 0.107 0.68 0.086
+ cohort size 2.50 0.004 1.82 0.022 0.73 0.014
+ parental characteristics 2.15 0.014 1.84 0.022 0.85 0.014
Weighted regressions; weights are the number of females in each group. Sample: 117 towns, 1050 town-cohort cells.
OLS are estimated coeﬃcients on exemption dummy and IV are IV estimates of θ in equation (2) in the paper;
instrumented variable is males’ high school graduation rate; instrument is exemption dummy. Exemption dummy
equals 1 if cohort aged 26-28 and born in treated town. P-values of IV estimates are based on the Anderson-Rubin
statistic (χ2(1)). Parental characteristics are: share of parents employed, unemployed, self-employed, with a high
school degree and with a university degree.40
Table 5: Robustness checks.
Males Females
OLS IV
First stage Reduced form
Exemption p-value Exemption p-value θ p-value
A: Falsiﬁcation on alternative samples
A1. Control vs Outer control 0.16 0.821 0.12 0.867 - -
A2. 30-35 vs 36-40 0.43 0.552 0.64 0.339 - -
A3. 30-32 vs 33-35 0.60 0.557 0.24 0.793 - -
B: Sample speciﬁcations
B1: Older cohorts
–30-32 1.88 0.055 1.68 0.067 0.89 0.042
–33-35 1.99 0.052 1.88 0.053 0.94 0.032
–no 30 2.12 0.021 1.75 0.036 0.83 0.023
–no 31 2.08 0.023 1.85 0.029 0.89 0.018
–no 32 2.14 0.016 1.96 0.019 0.91 0.011
–no 33 2.22 0.013 1.94 0.019 0.87 0.012
–no 34 2.03 0.025 1.99 0.016 0.98 0.010
–no 35 2.11 0.019 1.51 0.070 0.71 0.051
B2: Town size
– ≤50,000 inh. 2.45 0.015 2.19 0.018 0.89 0.011
– ≤40,000 inh. 2.55 0.013 2.67 0.004 1.04 0.002
– ≤20,000 inh. 2.72 0.022 3.02 0.005 1.11 0.003
C: Correlated shocks
C1. No Damage
– score: 0 & 6 3.76 0.002 3.27 0.002 0.87 0.001
– score: 0 3.87 0.017 3.16 0.044 0.82 0.028
C2. University
graduation rates -0.28 0.512 -0.34 0.428 - -
D: Pre-treatment schooling
D1. + secondary education 2.15 0.014 1.84 0.023 0.85 0.015
D2. conditional HS % 2.35 0.022 1.76 0.066 0.75 0.050
E: Area speciﬁc age dummies 1.97 0.028 1.83 0.027 0.93 0.016
Weighted regressions; weights are the number of females in each group.
Dependent variable: (males’ or females’) high school graduation rate except C2 (university graduation rates) and
D2 (conditional high school graduation rates). Control set: cohort and town dummies, quadratic in cohort size,
share of parents employed, self-employed, unemployed, with high school and university degree; D1 also includes
share of cohort with secondary school degree; E allows for speciﬁc age dummies for 5 groups of towns identiﬁed
by geographic proximity. Sample towns: Treated and control except A1 (control and outer control), B2 (treated
and control towns below threshold), C1 (only treated town with damage score 0-6 or 0 and neighboring control
towns). Sample cohorts: 26-28 and 30-35 except A2 and C2 (30-40), A3 (30-35) and B1 (26-28 and as reported
in the table). OLS are estimated coeﬃcients on exemption dummy and IV are IV estimates of θ in equation
(2) in the paper; instrumented variable is same as dependent but deﬁned on males; instrument is exemption
dummy. Exemption dummy deﬁned according to speciﬁcation in corresponding row (see text). P-values of IV
estimates are based on the Anderson-Rubin statistic (χ2(1)).References
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